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ABSTRACT 
In recent years, frivolous and inefficient multijurisdictional 
stockholder litigation has become a costly burden on corporations in 
the United States.  A popular solution among boards of directors has 
been to adopt bylaws with forum selection provisions (which require 
certain disputes to be litigated before one forum).  Those who 
oppose this solution have challenged these provisions on the grounds 
that they were passed as bylaws—which are unilaterally adopted by 
boards without stockholder consent.  These challengers argue that 
bylaws are like contracts, and, therefore, require the mutual assent of 
both stockholders and the corporation to be enforceable.  This 
argument implicates a classic theory of corporate law—the 
contractarian theory—but vastly oversimplifies the relationship 
between a stockholder, her corporation and the board of directors.  
When the contractarian theory of corporate law is applied to the full 
legal and practical reality of that relationship, the mutual assent 
argument falls apart and the contractarian theory is shown to support 
the enforceability of bylaws. 
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On September 29, 2010, the board of directors of Chevron 
Corporation, a Delaware corporation headquartered in San Ramon, 
California, adopted and amended a bylaw establishing the Delaware 
Court of Chancery as the exclusive forum for certain intra-entity 
actions.1  The bylaw reads: 
Unless the Corporation consents in writing to the selection of an 
alternative forum, the Court of Chancery of the State of Delaware 
shall be the sole and exclusive forum for (i) any derivative action or 
proceeding brought on behalf of the Corporation, (ii) any action 
asserting a claim of breach of a fiduciary duty owed by any director, 
officer or other employee of the corporation to the Corporation or 
the Corporation’s stockholders, (iii) any action asserting a claim 
arising pursuant to any provision of the Delaware General 
Corporation Law, or (iv) any action asserting a claim governed by 
the internal affairs doctrine.  Any person or entity purchasing or 
otherwise acquiring any interest in shares of capital stock of the 
Corporation shall be deemed to have notice of and consented to the 
provisions of this [bylaw].2 
In early 2012, lawsuits were filed in the Delaware Chancery Court 
against twelve major Delaware corporations that had passed forum 
selection bylaws like Chevron’s.3  The suits, filed by plaintiffs’ lawyers 
on behalf of stockholders, challenged the validity of the bylaws on a 
																																																																																																																																
 1. See Verified Complaint at 22, Boilermakers Local 154 Ret. Fund v. Chevron 
Corp., No. 7220 (Del. Ch. Feb. 6, 2012) [hereinafter Chevron Complaint]. 
 2. Id. at 6–7. 
 3. Marc A. Alpert & Patrick J. Narvaez, Continuing Challenges to Exclusive 
Forum Bylaw Provisions, in CHADBOURNE & PARKE LLP, CORPORATE PRACTICE 
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number of grounds, including: (1) that they were overbroad, (2) that  
they conflicted with other provisions of Delaware Law, (3) that they 
conferred upon the Chancery Court exclusive jurisdiction over all 
stockholders regardless of personal or subject matter jurisdiction, (4) 
that they were neither reasonable nor equitable, and (5) that they were 
unenforceable under contract law because they were unilaterally adopted 
by the boards and thus lacked the requisite mutual consent of the 
stockholders.4 
In response, ten of the companies repealed their forum selection 
bylaws, mooting their cases.5  The two remaining companies, Chevron 
and FedEx, had their cases consolidated and are currently before 
Chancellor Leo Strine, Jr. of the Delaware Court of Chancery.6  On June 
25, 2013, Chancellor Strine issued an opinion granting the defendants’ 
motion to dismiss on two counts of the plaintiffs’ complaints: Count I, 
that the bylaws are statutorily invalid because they exceed the board’s 
authority under Delaware statutory law and Count IV, that the bylaws 
are contractually invalid because they lack the mutual assent of the 
stockholders.7  The decision is likely to be appealed.8 
																																																																																																																																
 4. Chevron Complaint, supra note 1, at 2–8. 
 5. Alpert & Narvaez, supra note 3, at 3. 
 6. Chevron amended its bylaws to moot the subject matter and personal 
jurisdiction allegations.  In its amended form, the bylaw reads in relevant part, “the sole 
and exclusive forum . . . shall be a state or federal court located within the state of 
Delaware, in all cases subject to the court’s having personal jurisdiction over the 
indispensable parties named as defendants.” Chevron Corp., Bylaws of Chevron 
Corporation (Mar. 27, 2013), available at http://www.chevron.com/documents/pdf/ 
chevronbylaws.pdf (emphasis added).  Fed Ex’s Bylaw remains unchanged. FedEx 
Corp., FedEx Corporation: Amended and Restated Bylaws (Sept. 26, 2011), available 
at http://investors.fedex.com/phoenix.zhtml?c=73289&p=irol-govbylaws.  See also 
Tom Hals, Shareholders Attack Sue-in-Delaware Bylaws, THOMSON REUTERS NEWS & 
INSIGHT, Apr. 11, 2013, http://newsandinsight.thomsonreuters.com/Securities/News/ 
2013/04_-_April/Shareholders_attack_sue-in-Delaware_bylaws/. In his recent opinion, 
Chancellor Strine noted that “[b]ecause the two bylaws are similar, present common 
legal issues, and are the target of near-identical complaints, the court decided to address 
them together.” See Boilermakers Local 154 Ret. Fund v. Chevron Corp., 2013 WL 
3191981, at *1 (Del. Ch. June 25, 2013).  
  7.  See generally Chevron, 2013 WL 3191981, supra note 6. 
 8.  Delaware Court of Chancery Upholds Validity of Board-Adopted Forum 
Selection Bylaws, WSGR ALERT, (Wilson Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati), June 25, 2013, 
available at http://www.wsgr.com/WSGR/Display.aspx?SectionName=publications/ 
PDFSearch/wsgralert-forum-selection-bylaws.htm. 
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The Chevron plaintiffs’ argument that the bylaws were 
unenforceable under contract law is an outgrowth of a legal and 
economic theory of corporate law that classifies the relationship 
between the stockholder, the board of directors, and the corporation as 
contractual.9  This legal classification and the suggestion that mutual 
assent is necessary to enforce the “corporate contract” are the subjects of 
my interest, and the topic of this paper.  I will proceed in three parts.  
First, I will discuss the current controversy surrounding the forum 
selection bylaw; second, I will explore the contractarian theory of 
corporate law; and third, I will analyze the mutual assent arguments 
made in the Chevron litigation in light of this theory, Delaware state 
law, federal law, and relevant academic commentary.  My conclusion is 
that, subject to the caveat that they not be applied retroactively, validly 
adopted forum selection bylaws are an enforceable part of the corporate 
contract. 
I. THE FORUM SELECTION BYLAW 
The impetus for the adoption of the forum selection bylaw 
provision was a comment made in dicta by Vice Chancellor Laster in In 
re Revlon, Inc. Shareholders Litigation, that, “if boards of directors and 
stockholders believe that a particular forum would provide an efficient 
and value-promoting locus for dispute resolutions, then corporations are 
free to respond with charter provisions selecting an exclusive forum for 
intra-entity disputes.” 10   The attempt by boards of directors to use 
bylaws as opposed to charter provisions to enact exclusive forum 
selection provisions has given rise to a lively dispute among 
practitioners and scholars over the last few years. 
The debate is particularly contentious because the costs of 
defending duplicative and frivolous multijurisdictional stockholder 
lawsuits have, in recent years, become increasingly high.11  For example, 
a recent study found that in the six-year period from 2005 to 2011, the 
																																																																																																																																
 9. See generally Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate 
Contract, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1416 (1989). 
 10. In re Revlon, Inc. S’holders Litig., 990 A.2d 940, 960 (Del. Ch. 2010) 
 11. Alison Frankel, El Paso Shapes Up as Latest M&A Shareholder Venue Fight, 
THOMSON REUTERS NEWS & INSIGHT, Oct. 21, 2011, 
http://newsandinsight.thomsonreuters.com/Legal/News/2011/10_-_October/El_Paso_ 
case_shapes_up_as_latest_M_A_shareholder_venue_fight/. 
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percentage of mergers and acquisitions-related lawsuits brought in 
multiple jurisdictions increased by 44.7% (from 8.3% to 53%).12  The 
problem is that engaging corporations in numerous multijurisdictional 
lawsuits, in transaction-related litigation, for example, rarely results in 
increased value (in terms of price-per-share) for stockholders, but rather, 
results directly in increased fees for plaintiffs’ attorneys.13  The use of 
exclusive forum selection provisions, whether by charter or bylaw, is a 
means to cut down on these costs. 
It is also important, however, to subject corporations to the review 
that comes from litigation (or, the threat of litigation).  And this is the 
normative argument made by opponents of forum selection clauses—
that the vulnerability to suit in multiple jurisdictions subjects 
corporations to an important check.  But again, the problem is the 
enormous agency costs created by the plaintiffs’ attorneys’ incentive to 
file as many suits as possible; the costs of the lawsuits are born by 
stockholders, but the benefits—at the least the benefits of filing and then 
consolidating a multitude of suits—go to the plaintiffs’ attorneys.14  And 
for plaintiffs’ attorneys, Delaware is not an appealing state to litigate in.  
As two practitioners note:  
Plaintiffs’ attorneys are particularly motivated to file outside of 
Delaware on the belief that courts in other jurisdictions are less 
likely to dismiss weaker claims and limit attorneys fee awards.  
Companies may also be more inclined to settle suits filed outside of 
Delaware due to the likelihood that Delaware law will be misapplied 
in other, less corporate-savvy jurisdictions.15 
																																																																																																																																
 12. Matthew D. Cain & Steven M. Davidoff, A Great Game: The Dynamics of 
State Competition and Litigation 13–14, 35 (Jan. 13, 2013) (unpublished manuscript), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1984758. 
 13. Brian JM Quinn, Shareholder Lawsuits, Status Quo Bias, and Adoption of the 
Exclusive Forum Provision, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 137, 165 (2011). 
 14. Id. 
 15. Frank J. Aquila & Anna M. Kripitz, Designating Delaware: The Rise of 
Exclusive Forum Selection Provisions, PRACTICAL L.J., Oct. 2012, at 3–4, available at 
http://us.practicallaw.com/0-521-5321.  The fervent anti-Delaware position taken by 
plaintiffs’ attorneys is also attributable to a belief “that Delaware judges don’t give 
shareholders and their lawyers a fighting chance.” See Alison Frankel, Strine to M&A 
Bar: Don’t Stop Believing . . . in Delaware, THOMSON REUTERS NEWS & INSIGHT (Nov. 
14, 2011), http://newsandinsight.thomsonreuters.com/Legal/News/2011/11_-_ 
November/Strine_to_M_A_bar__Don_t_stop_believing_____in_Delaware/. 
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The exclusive forum selection provision, whether implemented by 
bylaw or charter, appears to be a middle ground solution.  As Brian 
Quinn suggests: “[b]y limiting litigation to a single forum, firms and 
shareholders can still subject themselves to review, but in the case of 
Delaware, also benefit from the court’s interest in policing litigation 
agency costs.”16 
Regardless of the underlying motivations or whether corporations 
should adopt exclusive forum selection clauses, let us take a look at the 
economic and legal theory behind the contractual classification of the 
corporate relationship. 
II. THE CORPORATE CONTRACT 
This section will proceed in three parts.  First, it will explore the 
economic and legal aspects of the contractarian theory of corporate law.  
Second, it will review the doctrine of mutual assent under general 
contract law. And third, it will analyze whether bylaws are an 
enforceable part of the corporate contract under Delaware state law and 
federal contract law, using the forum selection bylaw cases as an 
example. 
A. THE CONTRACTARIAN THEORY OF CORPORATE LAW 
1. The Economic Theory 
The courts and the academic community have, for many years, 
broadly conceptualized the relationship between the stockholders, the 
board of directors, and the corporation as contractual in nature. 17  
Incorporators draft certain promises in the charter, which stockholders 
then assent to at a certain price (determined by the market’s perception 
of the corporation’s value). 18   As discussed in detail below, the 
voluntary choice of entering into a contractual relationship with the 
corporation, by purchasing shares subject to the charter, represents a 
																																																																																																																																
 16. Quinn, supra note 13, at 165. 
 17. See, e.g., Ellingwood v. Wolf’s Head Oil Ref. Co., 38 A.2d 743, 747 (Del. 
1944) (finding that stockholder rights are contract rights); see generally Easterbrook & 
Fischel, supra note 9. 
 18. See FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC 
STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 17–22 (Harvard Univ. Press 1996) (1991). 
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contract.19  The underlying economic theory is based on this idea that a 
corporation will enter into and adapt a complex series of voluntary 
relationships with third parties to optimize its efficiency.20  That is: 
To say that a complex relation among many voluntary participants is 
adaptive is to say that it is contractual.  Thus [the] reference to the 
corporation as a set of contracts.  Voluntary arrangements are 
contracts.  Some may be negotiated over a bargaining table.  Some 
may be a set of terms that are dictated (by managers or investors) 
and accepted or not; only the price is negotiated.  Some may be fixed 
and must be accepted at the going price (as when people buy 
investments traded in the market) . . . .  The result of all of these 
voluntary arrangements will be contractual.21 
This theory, developed and applied in the late 1980s by Frank 
Easterbrook and Daniel Fischel, suggests that over time the open market 
will direct these contractual relationships, including the promises22 in 
each corporation’s charter, to reflect the most efficient and optimal 
structure.23  This process of adaptation will continue with the market 
driving efficiently structured corporations to flourish and those with 
inefficient structures to fail. 
There are a number of criticisms levied against this economic 
theory.  Particularly, there is criticism that it is premised on invalid 
market assumptions—that the market has low-to-zero transaction 
costs.24  Critics argue that there are externalities and other costs that 
impede contracting, making this model unrealistic.25  Several studies 
																																																																																																																																
 19. See infra Part II.A.2. 
 20. Id. at 14. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Among the promises incorporators must choose from are the state laws under 
which the company will operate.  Those states with efficient corporate laws will be 
favored.  In the United States today, the market has driven most major corporations into 
Delaware. 
 23. See generally Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 9. 
 24. Michael Klausner, The Contractarian Theory of Corporate Law: A Generation 
Later, 31 J. CORP. L. 779, 781–82, 796–97 (2006) (“The theory was based largely on 
perfect market assumptions and lacked empirical support. . . . The positive implication 
is that there are apparently impediments to contracting that may undermine the value-
maximizing claim of the theory and the theory’s minimalist view of corporate law.”). 
 25. Id. at 782, 784–91.  This characterization is rather misleading, however.  
Easterbrook and Fischel argue that the diversity among corporations should exist not in 
the charters alone, but in the entire corporate structure (i.e., throughout all the 
“contractual” relationships). See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 18, at 12–13.  
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have shown empirically that the basic structure of corporate charters is 
nearly uniform across the board.26  For some scholars, this uniformity 
(or the absence of diversity among charters) is proof that “as a 
description of reality, or a basis for policy prescription, the theory falls 
short.”27 
2. The Legal Theory 
The legal classification of a corporation’s complex series of 
voluntary relationships as contractual, however, does not require 
quantifiable diversity among corporate charters.  Nor does it require the 
assumption of a market with low-to-zero transaction costs.  Casting 
aside normative arguments about what form corporate law should take 
and positive arguments about how the market drives or has driven the 
contracting process, there is a far simpler take-away from the 
contractarian theory of corporate law.  This legal classification is not 
novel: it is discussed at length in Easterbrook and Fischel’s 1989 “The 
Corporate Contract.”  It is, in part, the basis for the only federal decision 
to tackle the forum selection bylaw (the Northern District of California’s 
Galaviz decision in 2011, discussed below),28 it is implicit in the mutual 
assent argument made in the Chevron complaint and, indeed, it is a 
primary motivator of Chancellor Strine’s recent dismissal of Count IV 
of the plaintiffs’ complaint. 
The charter of a corporation, at its most basic level, is a contract.29  
The incorporators draft its provisions and the stockholders determine its 
price.30  After execution in its initial public offering and subsequent 
secondary offerings, different parties enter and leave the relationship, all 
																																																																																																																																
And this very clearly exists—take for example the oft-taught business school 
comparison between 3M, in the 1970s and 80s, and Exxon, in the 1960s; or between 
JetBlue and Delta in the commercial airline industry.  Although these corporations’ 
charters are nearly identical, their structures and strategies differ greatly.  It is this 
diversity among the relationships of participants to which Easterbrook and Fischel were 
likely alluding. See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 18, at 13. 
 26. Klausner, supra note 24, at 782, 786–89. 
 27. Id. at 779. 
 28. See infra Part II.C.2. 
 29. EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 18, at 16 (“The terms present in the 
articles of incorporation at the time the firm is established or issues stock are real 
agreements.”). 
 30. Id. at 17–22. 
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pursuant to the charter.  The parties’ obligations and promises (terms) 
change from time to time as the charter is amended, which is reflected in 
the fluctuating share price.31  These terms are legally binding and are 
governed by the laws of a particular state.  
However, when the base contract (the charter) grants one party the 
power to unilaterally adopt new terms (bylaws), a question arises as to 
whether those terms form a part of the base contract, or fail for lack of 
mutual assent.  The scope of this inquiry can be narrowed further in light 
of the statutory and common law limits on bylaws—(i) that they not 
conflict with the charter and (ii) that the drafters (the board) are subject 
to certain fiduciary duties (discussed below) 32.  This was the question 
put to the Chancery Court in its consideration of the defendants’ motion 
to dismiss Count IV, which is implicit in the mutual assent argument. 
B. MUTUAL ASSENT 
An enforceable contract requires, among other things, an offer, 
acceptance, consideration, and in many circumstances, mutual assent (or 
a “meeting of the minds”).33  Indeed, “many doctrines of contract law 
ensure that an enforceable contract exists only when parties mutually 
consented to it, and not when parties did not mutually consent to it.”34 
Modifying an existing contract typically also requires mutual 
assent.  Generally, one party may not, by itself, rewrite an existing 
contract at some later time and expect those modifications to be 
enforceable against the other party.  Contract modifications often require 
new consideration from both parties.  This new consideration can itself 
be a modification of existing obligations, such as an increase in the 
performance obligations of one party or the acceptance of a reduction of 
the obligations of the other party.  That is, “[o]ne-sided contract 
modifications—where only one side’s obligation changes—are 
																																																																																																																																
 31. Id. 
 32. See infra Part II.C.1. 
 33. I say “in many circumstances” because there are some circumstances where 
mutual assent is not required, and therefore, there will be no “meeting of the minds.”  
For example, if a person makes a statement intended to dupe another party into some 
sort of legal detriment, or makes a firm offer but no longer wishes to be bound, a party 
may be bound against her will. See ERIC POSNER, CONTRACT LAW & THEORY 133 
(2011) (citing Lefkowitz v. Great Minneapolis Surplus Store, Inc., 86 N.W.2d 689 
(Minn. 1957); Carlill v. Carbolic Smoke Ball Co., [1893], 1 Q.B. 256 (U.K.)). 
 34. Id. at 41. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 17(1) (1981). 
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vulnerable to challenges on various grounds. . . .”35  This is the simplest 
explanation of the plaintiffs’ mutual assent argument in Chevron.   They 
argue that the bylaws are a contract and that one party, in this case the 
board, may not unilaterally modify them without the assent of the other 
party, in this case the stockholders.36  As will be shown, this concept of 
mutual assent in the context of bylaws is a red herring—the bylaws are 
only one part of a larger contract formed with sufficient mutual assent, 
which allows for certain, limited, unilateral modifications (a mechanism 
which is not unusual in contract law, or the real world). 
C. ARE BYLAWS A PART OF THE CORPORATE CONTRACT? 
In the Chevron complaint, the plaintiffs argue that bylaws are not a 
part of the corporate contract because they lack mutual assent.  Count IV 
alleges: 
There was no element of mutual consent to the forum choice 
imposed by the Bylaw unilaterally by the Directors without any 
notice to the stockholders or any opportunity to reject the Bylaw.  
The Bylaw represented a unilateral change to the provisions of the 
bylaws that the Company would not have been able to accomplish 
under ordinary principles of contract law. . . . Under contract law, 
the Board could not unilaterally amend the contract.  The bylaws 
cannot be amended as a matter of corporate law in a manner that 
could not be achieved under contract law.37 
With respect to the mutual assent argument, the complaint punts on 
the issue of enforceability under Delaware corporate law by arguing that 
unless it would be lawful under contract law, it cannot be lawful under 
state corporate law.38  The first court to consider this issue, the Northern 
District of California, also punted in the 2012 Galaviz 39  case by 
assuming the bylaw’s validity under Delaware state law and jumping 
																																																																																																																																
 35. POSNER, supra note 33, at 32. 
 36. Chevron Complaint, supra note 1, at 3, 21–22. 
 37. Chevron Complaint, supra note 1, at 21–22. 
 38. A number of the complaint’s other arguments, however, center on 
enforceability under the DGCL, but for the purposes of the mutual assent argument they 
punt. 
 39. Galaviz v. Berg, 763 F. Supp. 2d 1170 (N.D. Cal. 2011). 
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right into an analysis of contract law (discussed below).40  Chancellor 
Strine addressed enforceability under Delaware Law in his opinion—
finding that forum selection bylaws are enforceable.41  And because the 
corporate contract does not exist in a vacuum, but within the laws of a 
particular state, it is important to factor in the relevant statutory law.  
1. Delaware Statutory Law 
Section 109(a) of the Delaware General Corporation Law 
(“DGCL”) explicitly allows boards and stockholders to unilaterally 
adopt bylaws when authorized in a corporation’s charter: “any 
corporation may, in its certificate of incorporation, confer the power to 
adopt, amend or repeal bylaws upon the directors.” 42   Nearly all 
corporate charters utilize this rule, as bylaws are an important part of 
how the board manages the company’s day-to-day operations; requiring 
stockholder consent for mundane issues would defeat the efficiency of 
corporate structure.43 
Section 109(b) then limits the content of bylaws to “any provision, 
not inconsistent with the law or with the certificate of incorporation, 
relating to the business of the corporation, the conduct of its affairs, and 
its right or powers or the rights or powers of its stockholders, directors, 
officers or employees.” 44   Section 141(a) further limits the board’s 
power to adopt, amend, and repeal bylaws to matters concerning “[t]he 
business and affairs of [the] corporation.”45 
Although the board’s power to unilaterally pass bylaws is broader 
than that of stockholders, CA, Inc. v. AFSCME Employees Pension 
Plan,46 Section 109(a), and case law are also clear that stockholders may 
																																																																																																																																
 40. See infra Part II.C.2. 
 41. See Chevron, 2013 WL 3191981, supra note 6, at *2. 
 42. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 109(a) (2010). 
 43. Indeed, the suggestion that bylaws are somehow unenforceable for lack of 
mutual assent would “turn Delaware corporate law on its ear.” Joseph A. Grundfest & 
Kristen A. Savelle, The Brouhaha Over Intra-Corporate Forum Selection Provisions: A 
Legal, Economic, and Political Analysis, 68 BUS. LAW. 325 (2013) (manuscript at 5), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2164324. 
 44. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 109(b) (2010). 
 45. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2010). 
 46. 953 A.2d 227 (Del. 2008) (limiting the scope of stockholders’ ability to pass 
bylaws that tie directors’ hands). 
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trump any board-passed bylaw by enacting a stockholder bylaw or 
charter amendment.47 
So, in a case like Chevron’s where the charter authorizes its board 
to adopt bylaws on its own in satisfaction of Section 109(a), the Board 
need only appropriately exercise this right—in terms of adopting the 
Bylaw and narrowing its scope to inter-entity disputes as allowed under 
Sections 109(b) and 141(a)—to avoid running afoul of Delaware Law. 
At dispute in Chevron, aside from the lack of mutual assent, is, in 
Count I, the extent to which the bylaw is narrow enough to fit within 
Sections 109(b) and 141(a)’s limitations.48   Although this inquiry is 
valid, given the opinions of several well-respected scholars and the 
Delaware Chancery Court’s own decision upholding an exclusive 
foreign jurisdiction forum selection provision, it was no surprise that 
Chancellor Strine easily found the bylaw to be within the limits of 
Delaware law.49 
Under Delaware law, boards of directors are also bound by certain 
fiduciary duties.50  These fiduciary duties of care and of loyalty are 
owed to both the corporation and the stockholders and are akin to those 
of a trustee. 51   “Directors of [a] corporation are trustees for the 
																																																																																																																																
 47. Unisuper Ltd. v. News Corp., No. 1699-N, 2005 WL 3529317 (Del. Ch. Dec. 
20, 2005) (describing the board’s power as that of an agent’s). 
 48. Chevron Complaint, supra note 1, at 15–18. 
 49. See Baker v. Impact Holding, Inc., No. 4960-VCP, 2010 WL 1931032 (Del. 
Ch. May 13, 2010) (upholding a forum selection clause in a stockholders’ agreement 
mandating exclusive forum in Texas); Grundfest & Savelle, supra note 43, at 42–45; 
Stephen M. Davidoff, A Litigation Plan That Would Favor Delaware, DEALBOOK (Oct. 
26, 2010, 9:30 AM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2010/10/26/a-litigation-plan-that-
would-favor-delaware/ (discussing a similarly worded and structured bylaw provision). 
Chancellor Strine, in his most recent opinion, does not expressly address Section 
141(a), however, given the ease with which he dispensed of the plaintiffs’ 109(b) 
arguments, he almost certainly (indeed impliedly) would hold that the bylaws are 
proper under 141(a). See Chevron, 2013 WL 3191981, supra note 6, at *2 (“The forum 
selection bylaws, which govern disputes related to the “internal affairs” of the 
corporations, easily meet [the] requirements [of Section 109(b)].”).  
 50. See, e.g., World Health Alts., Inc. v. McDonald (In re World Health Alts., 
Inc.), 385 B.R. 576 (Bankr. D. Del. 2008). 
 51. See Bovay v. H.M. Byllesby & Co., 38 A.2d 808, 813 (Del. 1944); Loft, Inc. v. 
Guth, 2 A.2d 225, 238 (Del. Ch. 1938), aff’d, 5 A.2d 503 (Del. 1939).  “Directors of 
corporation stand in fiduciary relation to corporation and its stockholders. Their acts are 
subject to be tested by the familiar rules that govern the relations of a trustee to the 
trustee’s beneficiary.” DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141, Notes to Decision – Officers 
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stockholders, and their acts are governed by the rules applicable to such 
a relation, which exact of them the utmost good faith and fair dealing, 
especially where their individual interests are concerned.” 52   These 
fiduciary duties will also limit the extent to which the board may 
unilaterally adopt new terms to the corporate contract.  The duties that 
directors owe to stockholders include acting uninterestedly, in good 
faith, and on an informed basis.53  
The directors’ duty to act on an informed basis is evidenced by the 
well-known rationale behind forum selection bylaws: that they, at least 
in theory, reduce non-value added corporate litigation expenses, thereby 
increasing stockholder value.  Of course, an argument could also be 
made that the adoption of the bylaw was in “bad faith” or an “interested 
decision” insofar as it was done for the purposes of “ensur[ing] a 
hearing before judges likely to defer to management decisions.”54  But 
given (i) the latitude granted to boards to make business decisions with 
“any rational business purpose” (the “business judgment rule”)55 and (ii) 
the presumption that boards of directors act in good faith56 (combined 
with the lack of evidence presented by defendants, who hold the burden 
of proof)57 suggest that this argument would not hold water.   
Chancellor Strine did not address the fiduciary duty argument in his 
opinion, as no evidence of improper purpose was presented to the court.  
																																																																																																																																
Powers and Duties  (LexisNexis 2013); Bowen v. Imperial Theatres, Inc., 115 A. 918, 
922 (Del. Ch. 1922). But see Gottlieb v. McKee, 107 A.2d 240, 243 (Del. Ch. 1954) 
(stating that corporate officers and directors are not technically trustees). 
 52. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141, Notes to Decision – Officers Powers and Duties 
(LexisNexis 2013). 
 53. See Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del. 1986) (discussing the 
requirements for a decision of a board of directors to qualify for deference under the 
business judgment rule). 
 54. Chevron Fights 2-Front War Over Where Shareholders can Sue, WESTLAW J., 




 55. Kaplan v. Goldsamt, 380 A.2d 556, 568 (Del. Ch. 1977). 
 56. Gimbel v. Signal Cos., 316 A.2d 599, 608 (Del. Ch. 1974), aff’d, 316 A.2d 619 
(Del. 1974). 
 57. See Maldonado v. Flynn, 413 A.2d 1251, 1254 (Del. Ch. 1980), rev’d on other 
grounds sub nom. Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779 (Del. 1981). 
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This is further evidence that, by itself, the passing of a forum selection 
bylaw conforms to the fiduciary requirements placed on directors.58  
The question then turns to federal contract law and the extent to 
which a bylaw requires mutual assent to be binding upon stockholders—
or, whether bylaws are a part of the corporate contract at all. 
2. Contract Law: Federal Precedent 
This issue has only come before one federal court: a 2012 case 
before Judge Richard Seeborg in the Northern District of California.59  
Without deciding on validity under Delaware law, the Northern District 
refused to uphold a forum selection bylaw on the grounds that, even if 
the adoption of the bylaw was lawful under Delaware law, it was not 
enforceable under federal common law.60  The court held that, “under 
contract law, a party’s consent to a written agreement may serve as 
consent to all the terms therein, whether or not all of them were 
specifically negotiated or even read, but it does not follow that a 
contracting party may thereafter unilaterally add or modify contractual 
provisions.” 61   The court adopted the legal theory that the charter 
represented a contract between the stockholders and the board, and that 
the bylaw was an unenforceable unilateral amendment to that contract.  
In Galaviz, the board of directors of Oracle allegedly anticipated 
liability for fraudulently overcharging the government on certain of the 
company’s contracts, and in response, adopted a forum selection bylaw 
to limit the impending litigation to the Delaware Chancery Court.62  The 
Northern District explained: “[h]ere . . . the venue provision was 
unilaterally adopted by the directors who are defendants in this action, 
after the majority of the purported wrongdoing is alleged to have 
occurred, and without the consent of existing shareholders who acquired 
																																																																																																																																
 58. See Chevron, 2013 WL 3191981, supra note 6, at *16 (stating that a “[a 
proper] plaintiff may also argue that, under [Schnell v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 285 
A.2d 437 (Del. 1971)] the forum selection clause should not be enforced because the 
bylaw was being used for improper purposes inconsistent with directors’ fiduciary 
duties” but that such a situation was not presented to the court in this case). 
 59. See Galaviz v. Berg, 763 F. Supp. 2d 1170 (N.D. Cal. 2011). 
 60. See id. at 1174-75. 
 61. Id. at 1174. 
 62. See id. at 1171–72. 
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their shares when no such bylaw was in effect.”63  According to the 
Northern District, the directors had unclean hands. 
The decision was controversial both legally and factually.  As two 
scholars ask: 
How is it a violation of a fiduciary duty to adopt a bylaw stating that 
intra-corporate litigation involving a Delaware corporation (even if 
the potential allegation is known to the board) is to be adjudicated in 
Delaware under Delaware law?  The directors do not avoid any 
liability by adopting this rule, and are Delaware courts not to be 
trusted when it comes to enforcing fiduciary duties?  The court’s 
reliance on the underlying sequence of events thus rests on critical 
unproven assumptions of fact and operates through a mysterious, 
undescribed principle of law.64 
A priori, however, the Court’s underlying concern is valid—the 
adoption and then retroactive application of a bylaw has the effect of 
subjecting stockholders to terms to which they did not consent, and 
more importantly, to which they could not take reversing or 
ameliorating action (which will be explored in detail below).65  As two 
practitioners suggest: “[h]ad [the company’s] bylaws included a forum 
selection clause prior to any alleged wrongdoing . . . the district court 
may have come to a different conclusion.”66 
The Galaviz decision, then, turned on two grounds: (1) the legal 
classification of the adoption of a bylaw as an amendment to a contract 
that required mutual assent and (2) the retroactive effect of the bylaw. 
As will be shown, the first argument is incomplete because it does 
not consider the permission granted to the board in the charter to take 
certain unilateral action, and the second makes the case easily 
distinguishable from Chevron.67  Indeed, Chancellor Strine quickly set 
aside the Galaviz decision because it “rests on a failure to appreciate the 
contractual framework established by the DGCL for Delaware 
																																																																																																																																
 63. Id. at 1174. 
 64. Grundfest & Savelle, supra note 43, at 76. 
 65. See infra Part II.C.3. 
 66. Client Memorandum from Willkie Farr & Gallagher LLP, California Court 
Rejects the Enforceability of a Delaware Forum Selection Clause in Corporate Bylaws 
(Jan. 7, 2011), available at http://www.willkie.com/files/tbl_s29Publications% 
5CFileUpload5686%5C3643%5CCalifornia-Court-Rejects-The-Enforceability.pdf. 
 67. Grundfest & Savelle, supra note 43, at 76 (regarding distinguishability). 
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corporations and their stockholders.” 68  Still, the second ground of 
Galaviz appears to require a qualification regarding the enforceability of 
forum selection bylaws (at least under federal law), discussed in part 
III.C.4. 
3. Contract Law: Analysis 
The Supreme Court has long held forum selection provisions to be 
enforceable.  In the seminal case, The Bremen v. Zapata Offshore Co.,69 
the Court concluded that absent a strong showing “that enforcement 
would be unreasonable and unjust, or that the clause was invalid for 
such reasons as fraud or overreaching,” a “freely negotiated” forum 
selection provision should not be set aside.70  Under federal law today, 
forum selection provisions “are prima facie valid and [will] be enforced 
unless enforcement is shown to be unreasonable under the 
circumstances of the particular contract.”71  
In the infamous Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute case, the 
Supreme Court upheld an un-negotiated, unilaterally drafted form 
contract containing a venue provision. 72   The Court noted that the 
plaintiffs had conceded “they had notice of the clause and that they 
therefore, ‘presumably retained the option of rejecting the contract with 
impunity.’”73  The ability of a party to—at the very least—walk away 
from a contract is important under the Supreme Court’s analysis. 
The Galaviz court argued that unlike the plaintiffs in Carnival, the 
plaintiffs in Galaviz never had the option to opt out of the contract 
because it was retroactively applied.74  And, as discussed, this concern is 
valid—it seems that even under Bremen, it could be considered 
unreasonable to retroactively apply the bylaw provision.  However, 
recall that the Galaviz court argued more broadly: while “a party’s 
consent to a written agreement may serve as consent to all the terms 
																																																																																																																																
 68. Chevron, 2013 WL 3191981, supra note 6, at *14.  
 69. 407 U.S. 1 (1972). 
 70. Id. at 15. 
 71. 14D CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 
3803.1 (West 2013). 
 72. Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585 (1991). 
 73. Galaviz v. Berg, 763 F. Supp. 2d 1170, 1174 n.4 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (quoting 
Carnival Cruise Lines, 499 U.S. at 595). 
 74. Galaviz, 763 F. Supp. 2d at 1174. 
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therein , . . . it does not follow that a contracting party may thereafter 
unilaterally add or modify contractual provisions.”75  Here is where the 
analysis in Galaviz falls apart. 
The problem is that the bylaw is not the contract.  The bylaws, the 
charter, and the laws of the state of incorporation must be considered 
together.  A company’s charter is the contract voluntarily entered into by 
the parties and can only properly be modified by mutual assent (or in 
corporate law terms, by a majority stockholder vote).  This mutually 
assented to contract contains many provisions, each of which is a “real 
agreement.” 76   And, one of these agreements allows the board of 
directors to unilaterally adopt bylaws, subject to certain statutory and 
fiduciary limitations. 
This type of contractual arrangement is not unique.  For example, 
requirements contracts under the Uniform Commercial Code allow for 
quantity terms to be determined unilaterally by one party, subject to 
certain contractual and statutory limitations.77  The ability of trustees to 
take unilateral action regarding the disposition of assets of beneficiaries, 
subject to certain statutory, fiduciary, and contractual limitations is 
another example.  In each of these paradigms, the power to take certain, 
limited unilateral action is granted through mutual assent in an original, 
underlying contract. 78   Few would argue that we should ignore the 
underlying contractual relationship and focus exclusively on the 
unilateral act.  This notion that unilateral action, in and of itself, is 
somehow a prima facie violation of contract law is misplaced.79  Parties 
																																																																																																																																
 75. Id. 
 76. EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 18, at 16 (“The corporate venture has 
many real contracts. The terms present in the articles of incorporation at the time the 
firm is established or issues stock are real agreements. Everything to do with the 
relation between the firm and the suppliers of labor (employees), goods and services 
(suppliers and contractors) is contractual.”). 
 77. See U.C.C. §§ 2-201, § 2-306 (2011). 
 78. This limitation is key because a contract in which (i) one party retains the 
unlimited unilateral ability to modify the entire agreement or (ii) one party is obligated 
to perform only if the other party “wants,” as opposed to “needs” (as in a requirements 
contract), will certainly fail for lack of consideration. 
 79. “It is unimportant that [unilaterally adopted terms] may not be ‘negotiated’; the 
pricing and testing mechanisms are all that matter . . . . This should come as no shock to 
anyone familiar with the Coase Theorem.” EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 18, at 
17. 
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are free to contract as they wish, 80  and if the contract between the 
stockholder, her company, and the board specifically allows for the 
board to make certain unilateral decisions that (i) do not conflict with 
the underlying contract; (ii) do not breach its fiduciary duties; and (iii) 
are limited to certain statutory matters, why should they be estopped 
from doing so? 
Indeed as far back as the 1980s, during the development of the 
underlying economic theory, Easterbrook and Fischel tackled this issue: 
And of course the rules that govern how rules change are also real 
contracts.  The articles of incorporation typically allow changes to be 
made by bylaw or majority vote . . . . Sometimes terms are not 
negotiated directly but are simply promulgated, in the way auto 
rental companies promulgate the terms of their rental contracts.  The 
entrepreneurs or managers may adopt a set of rules and say “take 
them or leave them.” This is contracting nonetheless.81 
And just as it is unimportant whether the original terms of the 
charter are “negotiated” at a table by the board and stockholders—recall 
that stockholders control (i) whether they assent and (ii) the price they 
pay to assent—the passing of bylaws within the statutory and fiduciary 
limits need not be negotiated: stockholders may (i) reject the bylaws by 
passing their own (in Delaware, under Section 109(a), which trump the 
board’s bylaws) or (ii) sell their shares and walk (“take them or leave 
them”).82  From the moment a stockholder purchases her shares, she is 
																																																																																																																																
 80. The argument levied against the freedom of contract position in free market 
ideologies is that it ignores the often extreme bargaining inequalities between the 
parties—like for instance that between a single stockholder and a corporation. See Kent 
Greenfield, THE FAILURE OF CORPORATE LAW: FUNDAMENTAL FLAWS AND 
PROGRESSIVE POSSIBILITIES 19 (2006).  While bargaining inequalities absolutely exist, 
the fact remains that even the participant with the least amount of leverage still has the 
option to walk away—like in Carnival.  The lack of this option, however, can be 
problematic, as will be discussed, but, generally, even an inequality in leverage affords 
the least well-off participant the ability to choose. 
 81. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 9, at 1429. 
 82. This is not a purely federal contract law rational—the Delaware Chancery 
Court has adopted it as well. See In re MONY Group Inc. S’holder Litig., 853 A.2d 661 
(Del. Ch. 2004) (stating that, generally, stockholders have only two protections against 
the perceived inadequate business performance of their corporation: sell the stock or 
vote to replace the directors). 
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on notice that the charter grants the board the power to unilaterally adopt 
bylaws, which will be binding on stockholders without their approval.83 
Of course, a loss still exists.  There is a cost borne by disapproving 
stockholders even if they pass their own bylaw or sell their shares.  
Taking any sort of collective stockholder action (like passing a bylaw or 
initiating a proxy contest) is wrought with transaction costs, all of which 
slow down the process considerably.  During this time, the disapproving 
stockholder must endure the bylaw and if this stockholder walks away, 
she must also bear a cost.  Assume the adoption of the forum selection 
bylaw lowers the share price of a company’s stock: in order to walk 
away, the disapproving stockholder must accept the lower price for her 
share (even if the long-term result is a net gain in the share price).   
Although this “latecomer term” situation presents a problem for 
disapproving stockholders, the exact same problem exists in transactions 
with the bylaw-specific mutual assent that the plaintiffs call for. 84  
Suppose, instead, that the forum selection provision is adopted by 
stockholder bylaw or charter amendment, unless the provision is passed 
unanimously, a minority of stockholders will dissent.  These dissenting 
stockholders will face the same costs—if the share price falls as a result 
and they choose to sell, they sell at a loss.  The latecomer term problem 
permeates all forms of corporate contractual modification—it is not 
remedied by prohibiting unilateral board-adopted bylaws.  What is 
important to understand is that, even ignoring economics, after a bylaw 
is lawfully adopted or amended, stockholders have both notice and the 
ability to take reversing action or walk away—the same ability the 
plaintiffs had in Carnival Cruise Lines. Indeed, in Chancellor Strine’s 
recent opinion, he points out that stockholders have an additional level 
of safety: “Unlike cruise ship passengers, who have no mechanism by 
which to change their ticket’s terms and conditions, stockholders retain 
the right to modify the corporation’s bylaws.”85 
What’s puzzling about the Galaviz decision is how broadly the 
court felt it had to rule.  The court stated, “[the board] has not shown 
federal law requires or even permits the federal courts to defer to any 
provision of state corporate law that might purport to give a 
corporation’s directors the power to control venue under the 
																																																																																																																																
 83. Grundfest & Savelle, supra note 43, at 48. 
 84. EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 18, at 32. 
 85. See Chevron, 2013 WL 3191981, supra note 6, at *15. 
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circumstances discussed above.”86  However, this is because the court 
does not need to defer to state corporate law.  All it must do is 
recognize the charter as the base contract between the parties.  If it finds 
the charter to be a validly enforceable contract, then the court should 
recognize the power it grants to the board to take unilateral action that 
conforms to the contractual limitations in the charter.  This type of 
unilateral action takes place every day in thousands of corporations 
across the country, and it can all be categorized as contractual without 
the need to defer to state corporate law. 
Under Delaware case law, the analysis is the even clearer.  Not only 
has Delaware expressly adopted the Supreme Court’s position in 
Bremen, 87  but the Chancery Court has expressly held that “bylaws 
constitute a binding part of the contract between a Delaware corporation 
and its stockholders.”88  This is a state corporate law position that has 
been accepted by the Chancery Court for “several generations.”89  In 
1995, in Kidsco, the court stated: “It is undisputed that the 
[corporation’s] certificate of incorporation expressly authorize[d] the 
directors to amend or repeal the by-laws without obtaining stockholder 
approval.  Therefore, although the by-laws are a contract between the 
corporation and its stockholders, the contract was subject to the board’s 
power to amend the by-laws unilaterally.”90 
Thus, even after we show that the adoption of a forum selection 
bylaw is lawful under federal contract law and Delaware statutory and 
case law (as Chancellor Strine held in his recent opinion), we still have 
the situation in Galaviz where certain litigious acts or events that 
occurred before the adoption of the bylaw are retroactively swept up 
under the scope of the clause. 
																																																																																																																																
 86. Galaviz v. Berg, 763 F. Supp. 2d 1170, 1174, 1177 n. 4 (N.D. Cal. 2011). 
 87. Ingres Corp. v. CA, Inc., 8 A.3d 1143, 1146 (Del. 2010).  Chancellor Strine 
makes mention of this point several times in his recent opinion. Chevron, 2013 WL 
3191981, supra note 6, at *6, *36. 
 88. “In an unbroken line of decisions dating back several generations, our Supreme 
Court has made clear that the bylaws constitute a binding part of the contract between a 
Delaware corporation and its stockholders.” See Chevron, 2013 WL 3191981, supra 
note 6, at *14. See also, Grundfest & Savelle, supra note 43, at 48 “[The vested rights] 
theory has been roundly rejected for decades by courts in Delaware and in California.” 
 89. Id.  See also Kidsco, Inc. v. Dinsmore, 674 A.2d 483 (Del. Ch. 1995). 
 90. 674 A.2d at 492 (internal citations omitted). 
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4. Contract Law: Qualification on Retroactive Application 
In a scenario where a bylaw is passed that has an effect on acts or 
events that occurred prior to the bylaw’s adoption, federal contract law 
appears to require a qualification.  This scenario was not before 
Chancellor Strine in his considering of the defendants’ motion to 
dismiss and therefore, he properly declined to address it and the “array 
of purely hypothetical situations in which the bylaws of Chevron and 
FedEx might operate unreasonably.” 91  We, however, are not so 
constrained.  
This retroactive application scenario would effectively impose the 
new bylaw on wrongdoing that affected stockholders at a time when 
they had neither the option to take reversing action nor the option to 
walk away.  In these circumstances, as was the case in Galaviz, the 
federal common law appears not to support the retroactive application of 
the bylaw—it would deny stockholders their reversing or ameliorating 
rights, as required by Carnival, and could arguably (although, 
tenuously) rise to the level of “unreasonable or unjust” as established in 
Bremen.92 
Therefore, for the bylaw to be applicable, it appears that federal 
common law only requires that the underlying act or event of the cause 
of action have occurred after the adoption of the forum selection 
bylaw. 93   That being said, one could imagine a corporate charter 
providing that the board may adopt bylaws with forward and backward 
effect.  This scenario would give rise to an interesting situation because 
(1) such a bylaw would give stockholders the notice required by 
Carnival, (2) there would be no contractual limitation in the charter, and 
(3) assuming the provisions did not conflict with a different provision of 
the charter, there would be no statutory violation under a state law 
similar to Delaware’s Sections 109(b) and 141(a).  A bylaw with such a 
broad reach might trigger the unreasonability restriction in Bremen, 
however absent a provision in the charter granting the board retroactive 
																																																																																																																																
 91. See Chevron, 2013 WL 3191981, supra note 6, at *3 (“[I]t would be imprudent 
and inappropriate to address these hypotheticals in the absence of a genuine controversy 
with concrete facts. . . . Under our law, our Courts do not render advisory opinions 
about hypothetical situations that may not occur.”). 
 92. See The Bremen v. Zapata Offshore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 15 (1972) 
 93. This point is not universally supported. See Grundfest & Savelle, supra note 
43, at 75. 
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powers, federal common law likely limits the reach of forum selection 
bylaws to acts and events occurring after its adoption. 
In sum, in Chevron’s case, it is clear that (i) under Delaware law 
the adoption of the bylaw was valid and enforceable and (ii) under the 
federal contract law, as articulated by the Supreme Court, the bylaw is 
enforceable.  Only if a cause of action is rooted in an act or event 
occurring before the adoption of the bylaw could a court lawfully refuse 
to enforce it.  This is the Galaviz caveat. 
Indeed, Boeing Corporation has adopted a forum selection bylaw 
with the Galaviz caveat.94  Boeing’s bylaw begins: “With respect to any 
action arising out of any act or omission occurring after the adoption of 
this By-Law . . . .”95  This language seems to moot the issue in Galaviz,96 
and therefore complies with the requirements of federal contract law, as 
gleaned above.  
CONCLUSION 
The emergence of the exclusive forum selection bylaw has brought 
the contractarian theory of corporate law into the spotlight.  Challenges 
to the theory as applied legally—that the bylaw should be viewed in 
isolation and require special mutual assent to be enforceable against 
stockholders—are, while interesting fodder for academic discussion, 
unpersuasive when given a hard look.  And practically, these challenges 
move us no closer to solving the burgeoning problem of low-value 
added, frivolous multijurisdictional stockholder litigation.97 
Despite the academic resistance to economic theories premised on 
zero to low transaction cost markets, the long-standing legal 
																																																																																																																																
 94. However, Boeing adopted its bylaw, including the Galaviz caveat, in August 
2011, prior to the ruling in Galaviz and the current Chevron litigation. Boeing Co., 
Current Report (Form 8-K) (Aug. 29, 2011), available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/ 
edgar/data/12927/000119312511236668/d8k.htm. 
 95. Boeing Co., Bylaws of the Boeing Co., art. VII, § 4 (Aug. 27, 2012), available 
at http://www.boeing.com/corp_gov/bylaws.pdf. 
 96. CLAUDIA H. ALLEN, NEAL, GERBER & EISENBERG LLP, STUDY OF DELAWARE 
FORUM SELECTION IN CHARTERS AND BYLAWS 8 (2012), available at 
http://www.ngelaw.com//files/Uploads/Images/StudyofDelawareForum012512.pdf 
(“This [Boeing] language seems to respond to the Galaviz opinion . . . .”). 
 97. Frankel, supra note 11. 
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classification of the relationship between the stockholder, her 
corporation, and the board as contractual provides a clear answer: 
[B]ylaws, together with the certificate of incorporation and the [laws 
of the state of incorporation], form part of a flexible contract 
between corporations and stockholders, in the sense that the 
certificate of incorporation may authorize the board to amend the 
bylaws’ terms and that stockholders who invest in such corporations 
assent to be bound by board-adopted bylaws when they buy stock in 
those corporations.98 
Bylaws are a necessary mechanism built into the contract between 
stockholders and boards of almost all US corporations.  The bylaw 
mechanism gives boards the power to unilaterally draft certain, limited 
governing terms, subject to the parameters set by law.  Importantly, this 
power is specifically granted to boards in their charters—contracts 
formed with nearly undisputed and sufficient, albeit non-traditional, 
mutual assent.  Only when a bylaw attempts to apply retroactively do 




 98. See Chevron, 2013 WL 3191981, supra note 6, at *2. 
